By November 3, three key outcomes regarding Iran are unlikely to occur. First, the United States will not publicly outline the fate of uranium tracked by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nor indicate who will verify its status or what repercussions Iran faces for non-compliance. Second, Iran will not provide the IAEA with a specific date and list of sites for access to Isfahan. Third, no agreement will be reached between the two governments on a mutual shipping arrangement. This would involve Iran halting attacks on commercial vessels while the U.S. opts to board or redirect sanctioned tankers instead of sinking them.
If these events do not unfold, President Trump’s pause in dealing with Iran represents merely a timeline, not diplomacy. Should any occur, reevaluation is warranted. However, the current pause provides no discernible motivation for either party to act before the election. Trump’s October 8 statement did not impose any conditions on Iran. He mentioned ongoing productive talks and reaffirmed the blockade on Iranian ports, linking his commitment not to attack with the midterm election timeline. He also suggested that future strikes might follow the election.
Unlike his previous pause in April, which required Iran to reopen Hormuz entirely, the current stance asks Iran to wait without offering clear incentives. Prior to Israel’s initial strikes in June 2025, the IAEA estimated Iran held 441 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60%. However, in March, Director General Rafael Grossi reported an estimated 200 kilograms might remain stored at Isfahan, with some at Natanz. Iran has not disclosed the status of the uranium, and inspectors have not revisited the bombed sites.
Determining the uranium’s whereabouts is essential. Without this, Washington cannot negotiate its handling, and enrichment capacity cannot be verified. Vice President JD Vance demands a significant reduction in Iran’s enrichment capability. Yet, specifics are needed. Washington must clarify the acceptable disposition for the remaining enriched uranium, identify the authority for verification, and state the consequences for Iran’s non-compliance.
A new approach to shipping must involve concessions from both sides. Iran should cease attacks on commercial vessels, while the U.S. could intercept sanctioned tankers instead of destroying them, except when a vessel attacks U.S. forces or shipping. In September, U.S. forces targeted Iranian tankers after a threatened navy ship attack. Under revised rules, options narrow, with the blockade on Iranian ports remaining, but enforcement methods changing.
Iran would likely question the benefits of such a deal. The response would be minimal—no lifting of sanctions, no end to the blockade, no broader demands met. However, it would offer a structured way to resolve disputes. The aim is modest—to test Iran’s ability to make verifiable commitments.
In New York, Iran reportedly asked for the lifting of the blockade, release of frozen assets, and an end to warfare, which Trump rejected. The issue isn’t silence; neither party has initiated a narrow first step. Iran’s intentions remain ambiguous, with the motion to impeach Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi yet to be prioritized, despite prior approval of his trip by the Supreme National Security Council’s secretary.
No clear proof exists that Iran cannot negotiate a deal, but the contested authority within Tehran necessitates testing if commitments can be fulfilled. If the U.S. states its terms and Iran does not comply, it’s unclear whether reluctance or inability is to blame. Clarity is needed.
Scheduling access without reciprocation from Washington shifts responsibility to the administration. Accomplishing these steps doesn’t equate to peace. It signifies the pause achieved necessary groundwork for negotiation. Iran, potentially biding time, might not act, but inaction won’t salvage the pause. A timetable without terms is merely a timeline. If Iran seeks agreement, setting access terms could be its minimal step forward.
Charbel A. Antoun is a Washington-based journalist focusing on U.S. foreign policy with expertise in the Middle East and North Africa.