In recent days, Americans faced disruptions in several essential systems. Microsoft 365 experienced an outage, affecting email and collaboration tools for a day. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) suspended departures nationwide due to telecommunications network instability. Shortly after, Chase banking customers could not access their funds. Investigations into these incidents have yet to link them to cyberattacks.
Microsoft found no signs of malicious activity. Chase confirmed its issues were not cyber-related. The FAA pointed to potential sources at a remote radio site but ruled out cyberattacks. Federal officials reported no evidence connecting these outages or attributing them to hostile actors. This lack of connection raises concern.
For two decades, organizations have invested heavily in cybersecurity. Industries emerged to protect systems from external threats. Common practices include penetration tests, hostile traffic monitoring, and threat intelligence gathering. Investments have proved crucial in keeping adversaries at bay. However, recent disruptions highlight internal issues. Planned technical changes, rather than sophisticated attacks, played a role in these failures.
I spent two decades at the FAA in air traffic control, retiring as an air traffic manager. Since 2006, I have been involved in the FAA’s safety risk management process. Success often hinges on evaluating changes before implementation. When responsibility for change becomes vague, organizations struggle.
Consider the disclosed incidents. The FAA identified a contractor working on new router deployment at a remote site as a potential source of trouble. Microsoft traced its issues to a network capacity upgrade conflicting with a later system change. Chase attributed its outage to a software bug. Two of the incidents are linked to planned work.
Standard controls like firewalls and intrusion detection systems are insufficient for addressing the nuances of change management. These controls fail to question the timing of maintenance, the presence of rollback plans, or the understanding of implications if a change fails. Management, not technology, should handle these considerations.
The aviation industry learned the importance of accountability long ago. The FAA’s latest safety management order requires a risk acceptance signature for planned changes. Federal banks follow similar guidelines, but paper procedures do not equate to actual accountability.
The term ‘routine’ can be misleading. Changes deemed routine can harbor risks due to lack of scrutiny.
The supervision of a recent FAA router replacement remains unclear. The project’s accountability, risk assessment, and testing need further clarification. Congress members seeking oversight should focus on these elements and pose similar questions to Microsoft and Chase.
Ultimately, a substantial financial investment or change in technology will not solve these problems. The core issues lie in accountability for changes and recognizing the risks of routine procedures.
Vincent E. Bianco III, principal consultant of Marivin Consulting Services LLC, served in FAA air traffic control for 23 years before retiring as an air traffic manager.
