In August 2001, Margaret Gillespie, an FBI analyst, sought to add Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi to the Department of State’s watch-list. This request followed the discovery of significant yet previously overlooked intelligence at the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC). Both individuals had potential ties to terrorist activities targeting the United States.
By this time, the U.S. Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were aware that al-Mihdhar might still be in the U.S., while there was no confirmation that al-Hazmi had left. This spurred the FBI to instruct its New York and Los Angeles field offices to locate the men. However, efforts in New York resulted in an unproductive search. The Los Angeles office received its instructions on September 11, 2001.
The CTC insisted that the State Department, Customs, and INS immediately add al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to their respective watch lists. These lists included VISA/VIPER for visas, the TIPOFF system, and the Treasury Enforcement Communication System. These measures were intended to delay and investigate individuals of interest at entry points, but did not affect domestic movement within the U.S.
On August 24, 2001, both men were added to the watch lists highlighting their possible U.S. travel. By August 31, al-Mihdhar was tagged as “armed and dangerous” in a database used by INS and Customs. On September 4, the U.S. State Department revoked al-Mihdhar’s visa, notifying INS of this decision the following day and identifying him as a potential witness in an ongoing investigation.
Separate intelligence streams raised concerns. The FBI Phoenix Field Office, on July 10, had reported unusual numbers of radical Islamists enrolling in U.S. flight schools and speculated a possible link to terrorist activities. They proposed compiling a list of aviation schools, forming connections with them, sharing suspicions with the Intelligence Community, and potentially scrutinizing visa applications for flight school attendees. Headquarters, however, did not act on these suggestions before 9/11.
Communications break-downs were evident. Minneapolis agents were uninformed about the Phoenix memo or about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. Simultaneously, the Phoenix office remained unaware of Moussaoui and the other two men. FBI Headquarters failed to synthesize these pieces of intelligence. The Radical Fundamentalist Unit Chief testified that no connections among these issues were identified before the attacks.
“For later discussions about CIA and FBI communication failures or barriers within the intelligence community, the real issue was internal communication within the FBI,” a conclusion reached was that this was a failure of competence and focus, not simply a lack of new authorities for domestic surveillance.